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2

IN THE SUP HEME COU ~

OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN TBE MATTER OF T :BE ESTATE ) REPLY TO PETITION

) FOR REHEARING

OF FRED W. HARPER,

)

No. 8049

Deceased.

APPELLANT'S REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court
of the State of Utah

Honorable Clarence E. Baker, Judge

STATEMENT
Respondent in her Petition for Rehearing

listed some eleven points in which she claimed

that this court erred in its decision
21, 1954.

It should be noted that

or

January

a~ost

all of

these p0ints were raised and fully considered by
the court in ita opinion.

It is a fundamental

rule that a rehearing will no·t be granted unless
something new and important is offered for the

court's consideration, Ducheneau v. House 4 Utah
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463 1 11 Pac. 619; Brown v. Pickard, 4 Utah 292
ll Pac. 512.

Respondent's Petition for Rehearing
"'

is in effect a re-argument of the matter originally

briefed and argued to the court.

However, we

shall refer to certain arguments raised by
Respondent's Brief.
ARGUMENT

The Washington Case cited by Respondent,
McPherson v. McPherson, (Wash 1939) 93 P. 2d
429, is not in point because there was an appeal
pending.

!hat the appeal abates upon death of

ene ot the parties during an appeal is certainly

not the majority rule.

See 3G A. L. R. 1466,

at page 1469, citing Missouri, California, Oregon,
Kansas, and Maryland eases.

In addition, the

statute being construed by the· Washington Court

in that case, Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup) Sec. 988,
cited on page 429 of the case, required the

entry of a final judgment.

The only ceurt

that we _coula find that has a statute similar
be our own in that the finality ef t:te decree
Df divorce was deferred for six months and no
~urther

act was necessary was Kansas, Gen. Statutes

~r Ka~~~~-
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1949. 60-1514~ where it was held

that the proviaions of the divorce statute
in accordance with which the aecree was renderea
were intended. to prevent a marriage by either
party 11\d.thin six mentbs after the decree anci

that aa to that matter enl7 the decree waa not
final, ever7 ether result was a complete

disao~

lutionoef the marriage tellowing at enee, Durlan4
v. Durland, 67 Kan. 734, 74 P. 274.
~he argument that the action should. aba.Se

as te property interests in addition to the
marital status because the property award is

incidental tc the divorce action has certainl7
been given no weight by the above cited authorities.

Rea pendent' a argument that tbe court's

atatutery power te dispose of proprt,- is a mere
1no1deat to the court's &Uthority to dissolve
the marri.se is without substance.

u. c.

A.~

Sec. 30-3-5,

1953, states:

"When a d.eeree .91 divorce k~ade the court
may make such orders in relation to the

property and parties ••• as may be
equitable •••• Such subsequent changes or
new orders may be made bJ the court with
respect to the disposal of the children or the
distribution o£ iroperty as shall be reasonohildren~

able and proper.

(Em.phas is ours)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

'1

Tbere ia no question but that the lower court
had jurisdiction to make a propert7 award when

the divorce decree was made because the marital
atatus was then still extant; but it the existance

of said status is a neeeasarJ incident, as Respondent argues, where then did the lower court
acquire jur-isdiction to make the order ot June

19, 1950, purpGrting te set the decree asidef
~bis

argument would operate against Reapandent

rather than in her favor.
Respondent states on page 12 of her brief
that the rule adapted b7 this eourt would
make "serious inroads in the marketability ot
title to real property and can only further
contuse the fee to the expense and harrassment
of owners ••• u
....

Just how this would occur, the
.

Respondent did not boSDer to state.

But the

court's attention should be directed to how
real property law would be confused by adop·ting
the viewpoint of the Respondent.

If death iluring

the interlocutory period automatically set the
property interests at large there would be no
sales of property at all that came through an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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interlocutory decree, even after the interlocutory period had run and the decree had become
tinal.

It .&.• sproperty were awarded to B, and the

interlocutory decree became final, an intending
purchasar rrOM B would have to ascertain with
certainty that A had not died during the period, b

because under Reapondent•s viewpoint, 'the aeatb
would automaticallJ Yacate the decree and
the property interests A' heirs.

reve&~

Who, then,

woyld purehase preperty that was acquired thraugh

an interleeutor7 deeree!

Also, the present case

under consideration shows the ditt'icu.lty of this

court adoptins the Bespondent•a viewpoint.

It

the death vacated the interloeutorr decree as
it affected the property im.terests, how could said

vacation recreate the joint tenaey, one of the
tenants being dead?

We submit that the e£feot ot an interlocutory
iecree conveying preperty isto give the recipient
a present interest in that property, a risht of

occupanc1, a right to the risbts andprofits, and
this being the ease, an automatice vacation ef the
decree could not recreate the situation as it
exisi-- "' _.._ ....,__
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time the decree was made, since the recipient
would have dissipated some ot the property
passing under the decree, particularly it
the award were moneyl
Nor can we be concerned with the Respondent's
discussion of the tacts, on pages 10-12, ot her
brief, wherein the divorce action proper was
erroneously described as "Ex parte•.

Whether

"'

the interlocutor,- award in this caae was based.

upon suilt or need or both, the death durimg
the interlocutory period did not a1. ter tbat

in the least; both the built
~emainedo

point

ana/or

ta•'

need

The effeQt of the Respenient•s view•

woul~

be te reward the guilty or to take

propertJ from the needy.
CONCLUSION
We submit that the court's decision in this
case was correct and rests upon sound. principle-s

ot law regarding the dh'elution or property
and therefore request that the Petition for Rehearing be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
Chris T. Praggasti,
Jehn E. Stone,
Attorneys tor Appellant.
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